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Introduction 
After years of recession and stagnation, the European economy picked up speed slightly in 
2014, and 2015 saw strong signs of recovery, with growth reaching almost 2 per cent. Driven 
by increasing consumption and rising real incomes due to historically low inflation rates, as 
well as the expansion of exports supported by weak currencies, this recovery came at a time 
when storm clouds were brewing in the global economy. In 2015, the US increased the 
benchmark interest rate for the first time since the eruption of the economic and financial 
crisis in 2007-08. Chinese growth began transitioning to a new, lower normal, and key 
emerging markets, such as Brazil and Russia were in crisis, not to mention geopolitical risks 
like the huge inflow of refugees and migrants, and the conflict in the Middle East. These 
external conditions made Europe’s improving performance even more noteworthy, but also 
question just how sustainable the European recovery can be.  
The aim of this contribution is to analyse Europe’s economic performance, focusing on the 
developments in 2015, but also placing them in a broader context. Just like our contribution to 
the previous year’s Annual Review (Benczes and Szent-Iványi, 2015), this piece on the 
European economy focuses not only on the performance of the EU as a whole, but also on its 
Member States. It demonstrates which countries managed to outperform the others and which 
needed to heat up their engines. EU-wide generalizations along with data on average-
performance can be misleading for such a heterogeneous region; yet, there is clearly evidence 
of some convergence among EU countries in terms of economic performance.  
Europe’s economic recovery has had a clear impact on its labour markets as well. The second 
half of this contribution provides a more detailed overview of labour market developments in 
Europe in the post-crisis era. After several years of labour market turmoil, unemployment is 
once again decreasing across the continent. Nevertheless, Europe is not out of the water yet, 
as unemployment is still higher and the labour force participation rate is still lower than 
immediately before the crisis. A special emphasis is put on investigating the impacts of the 
crisis of labour markets and how labour market policies have reacted.  
Section I presents the global economic and political context, which is then followed by a 
discussion of the main economic indicators and Europe’s performance in Section II. Section 
III focuses on monetary and fiscal policy developments, while Section IV provides an 
analysis of post-crisis labour market trends. The final section offers some brief conclusions. 
 
I. The Global Economic and Political Context 
                                                          
1 We are grateful to the editors, Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton, for insightful and 
constructive comments 
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Global growth continued its decelerating trend in 2015, slowing to 3 per cent, which was well 
below the 5-6 per cent rates of the pre-crisis era. The collapse of the financial sector in 2007-
2008 hit the developed economies unprecedentedly hard, while the developing world and the 
emerging markets proved to be more resilient to the negative effects of the crisis. By 2015, 
however, the situation changed dramatically. Slowly but steadily, advanced economies 
managed to increase their growth performance from 1.8 per cent in 2014 to 2 per cent in 2015, 
while emerging and developing economies suffered a huge drop in growth momentum by 
slowing from 4.5 per cent in 2014 to 3.7 per cent (see Table 1). 2015 proved to be the fifth 
consecutive year of slowing growth performance in less developed countries.  
 
Table 1. The global economic context – Global and regional GDP growth rates 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
World 4.1 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.0 
Advanced economies 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.0 
EU 1.8 -0.5 0.2 1.4 1.9 
USA 1.6 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.5 
Japan -0.5 1.7 1.6 -0.1 0.7 
Emerging and developing economies 6.2 5.4 4.9 4.5 3.7 
Brazil 3.9 1.8 2.7 0.1 -3.8 
China 10.3 9.6 8.0 7.4 6.9 
India 7.9 4.9 6.9 7.1 7.2 
Russia 4.3 3.4 1.3 0.6 -3.7 
Source: European Commission (2016, p. 179). 
Note: * indicates forecast data. 
 
The continued strong performance of the US, and the acceleration of growth in Japan and the 
EU all contributed to the relatively good performance of advanced economies. However, 
speculation that US monetary policy would be tightened, combined with an eventual interest 
rate rise by the Federal Reserve in December, as well as the accompanying reversal of capital 
flows, increasing volatility in financial markets, and the weakening of emerging market 
currencies all dampened the impact of the American economy on global growth.  
The single most important factor for the relatively weak performance of developing and 
emerging economies was the continuous fall of commodity prices, which exerted highly 
negative impacts on most of these economies through several channels, leading to higher 
unemployment, lower tax revenues, increased government debt, intensified credit risk, rising 
current account deficits, and falling profitability and investment activities. Although the 
deterioration in the (net barter) terms of trade was somewhat counterbalanced by the sharp 
depreciation of most emerging market currencies, the loss of value of national currencies, in 
turn, could cause serious currency mismatches in both the financial and the non-financial 
sector’s balance sheets, making emerging markets more susceptible to shocks.  
The most vulnerable region of the year was perhaps Latin America – the region from where 
several contagious financial crises had emanated in the last three and a half decades. The EU 
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devoted significant efforts in the last fifteen years to strengthen its economic ties with the 
continent, mostly by ratifying trade agreements. The EU has indeed become the leading 
investor and the second most important trading partner for the region, with Brazil alone 
accounting for more than half of European investments and one-third of trade. The 
deceleration of economic growth can significantly undermine Europe’s efforts to further 
expand economic relations with the region.  
From 2012 onwards, the Chinese economy has been slowing down first to below 8 per cent, 
and by the end of 2015 to less than 7 per cent. This slowdown was not simply the 
consequence of the business cycle, but a deliberate effort of the Communist government to 
make the country more resilient to external shocks, and reorientate the economy towards a 
more consumption-driven model, with slower but more sustainable growth rates (IMF, 
2015b). Such a policy shift raises serious concerns in the rest of the world, including the EU, 
as a deliberate shift in the main driver of Chinese growth can lead to a slowdown in 
international trade.2  
As in previous years, global political tensions meant serious drags on economic prosperity; 
suffice to mention the acute conflict between Russia and Ukraine (and as a consequence 
Russia and the advanced economies) or the Syrian crisis, which has led to unprecedented 
flows of refugees to Europe.3 The migration crisis has tested the solidarity among Member 
States, which was also undermined by the British threat of exit – all issues raising serious 
concerns about the future of the European economy and even the integration project itself. 
As a consequence, despite good growth performance of the advanced economies along with 
the recovery in Europe, long-term growth prospects have not become any better. Due to 
serious macroeconomic imbalances such as record high public and private sector debt and 
structural deficiencies; particularly weak, undercapitalised financial markets; low investment 
activity; and negligible productivity increases (IMF, 2015a), the capacity of the global 
economy to weather a potential downturn looks bleak.  
 
II. Europe’s economic performance: growth, inflation and external balance 
Despite the global tensions, the EU’s economic recovery continued in 2015. After gaining 
growth momentum in 2014, growth further accelerated to 1.9 per cent in 2015, bringing 
Europe’s business cycle in sync with the rest of the advanced world after several years. This 
relatively good growth performance was driven by a number of factors. Private consumption, 
subdued for years after the crisis, picked up significantly in 2015, surpassing its pre-crisis 
levels in real terms, fuelled in part by an increase in disposable incomes due to low oil prices. 
Investments and exports also grew significantly, reflecting renewed confidence in markets, 
although levels of investment in real terms still remain below their peak registered in 2007. 
The sharp fall in growth rates across the developing world is yet to have an impact on 
European exports, which were helped by the depreciation of the euro. 
However, as in previous years, economic performance was highly uneven among Member 
States. The usual cleavages familiar from past years have remained: (1) countries outside of 
the eurozone grew somewhat faster than those inside (1.9 per cent and 1.6 per cent, 
                                                          
2 China, the world’s second largest economy, has become the second most significant trading partner of the EU 
after the US, while the EU is carving out the highest share in China’s foreign trade. 
3 On the migration crisis see Börzel’s and Monar’s contributions to this volume.   
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respectively); (2) newer Member States achieved higher growth rates than older ones, with 
Malta (4.9 per cent), the Czech Republic (4.5 per cent), Poland (3.5 per cent), Romania (3.6 
per cent), Slovakia (3.5 per cent), Latvia and Hungary (both 2.7 per cent) performing above 
the EU average (see Table 2). The faster growth of newer Member States may be evidence of 
strengthened convergence processes within the EU, severely halted by the crisis. 4 Among the 
older members, the performance of Ireland (6.9 per cent), Sweden (3.6 per cent) Spain (3.2 
per cent), and the UK (2.3 per cent) are noteworthy. On the other end of the spectrum, 
Greece’s economy stagnated (0 per cent) due to the uncertainties caused in the first half of the 
year around the extension of its bailout programme, and further austerity measures required 
after the extension.5 Finland also stagnated, and three other countries (Austria, Italy, and 
Estonia) registered very low growth rates below one percent. The good news however, is that 
after several years of harsh contraction in quite a few Member States, 2015 proved to be the 
first post-crisis year that saw no country with a negative growth rate.  
Among the large economies, Germany maintained its momentum from 2014, achieving 1.7 
per cent in 2015; driven mostly by consumption, but private investment and a strong current 
account surplus also had a role. France finally seems to have left its close-to-stagnation state 
of the previous three years behind, although its growth rate of 1.1 per cent, fuelled by 
increased domestic consumption, is hardly spectacular. Italy is one of the countries in the EU 
which faced severe losses during and after the crisis. Nevertheless, 2015 proved to be a 
milestone for the Italian economy, as it managed to record a positive, though still moderate 
growth level of 0.8 per cent.  
 
Table 2. Average EU growth rates (in per cent) and the best and worst performing Member 
States 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
EU average 1.7 -0.4 0.2 1.4 1.9 
Standard 
deviation 
2.9 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.6 
Best 
performers 
Poland (4.8) 
Latvia (5) 
Lithuania (6.1) 
Estonia (8.3) 
Lithuania (3.8) 
Estonia (4.7) 
Latvia (4.8) 
Luxembourg (4.5) 
Lithuania (3.5) 
Poland (3.5) 
Romania (3.5) 
Latvia (3.0) 
Malta (2.6) 
Ireland (5.2) 
Luxembourg 
(4.1) 
Hungary (3.7) 
Malta (3.5) 
Poland (3.3) 
Ireland (6.9) 
Malta (4.9) 
Luxembourg 
(4.7) 
Czech Rep. 
(4.5) 
Sweden (3.6) 
Romania (3.6) 
Poland (3.5) 
Slovakia (3.5) 
Worst 
performers 
Portugal (-1.8) 
Greece (-8.9) 
Portugal (-3.3) 
Greece (-6.6) 
Greece (-3.2) 
Cyprus (-5.9) 
Croatia (-0.4) 
Finland (-0.4) 
Italy (-0.4) 
Cyprus (-2.5) 
Finland (0) 
Greece (0) 
                                                          
4 It is worth noting though that the newer Member States’ growth record was rather diverse during the years of 
the crisis. Poland experienced a solid positive growth rate on the one hand, while Latvia suffered a cumulated 
loss of 25 per cent on the other hand. 
5 On the Greek experience see Featherstone’s and Hodson’s contribution to this volume.  
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Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 152). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed rates at least one standard deviation higher than the 
EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation lower. * indicates forecast data. 
 
Levels of inflation remained subdued across the EU in 2015, continuing the trend of 
moderation seen in previous years. The EU’s average harmonized consumer price index stood 
at exactly 0 per cent in 2015; approaching slowly the danger zone of deflation. Low energy 
prices, falling import prices and the still present output gap in the euro area were, 
nevertheless, counterbalanced by more dynamic economic growth along with the pick-up of 
consumer demand which caused core inflation, calculated without energy and food price 
changes, to rise steadily. Looking at individual cases, it is striking that inflation remained 
weak even in countries which registered decent growth rates, such as Ireland (0.3 per cent), 
the UK (0.1 per cent), Poland (-0.6 per cent) or Spain (-0.5 per cent). As shown by these 
numbers, deflation was clearly a fact of life in many Member States in 2015, especially in 
Cyprus (-1.6 per cent) and Greece (-1.0 per cent), but a decrease in consumer price levels 
happened in a total of 11 economies. No country came close to the ECB’s target rate of 2 per 
cent inflation, with Malta’s 1.2 per cent being the highest (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Average EU inflation rates (harmonized indices of consumer prices, in percentages) 
and countries with the lowest and highest values 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
EU average 3.1 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.0 
Standard 
deviation 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 
High 
inflation 
Romania (5.8) 
Estonia (5.1) 
UK (4.5) 
Latvia (4.2) 
Lithuania 4.1 
Slovakia (4.1) 
Hungary (5.7) 
Estonia (4.2) 
Poland (3.7) 
Slovakia (3.7) 
Czech Republic 
(3.5) 
Estonia (3.2) 
Romania (3.2) 
Netherlands 
(2.6) 
UK (2.6) 
Austria (1.5) 
UK (1.5) 
Romania (1.4) 
Malta (1.2) 
Austria (0.8) 
Sweden (0.7) 
Belgium (0.6) 
Low inflation 
or deflation 
Czech 
Republic (2.1) 
Slovenia (2.1) 
Sweden (1.4) 
Ireland (1.2) 
Greece (1.0) 
Sweden (0.9) 
Bulgaria (0.4) 
Cyprus (0.4) 
Portugal (0.4) 
Sweden (0.4) 
Latvia (0.0) 
Greece (-0.9) 
Slovakia (-0.1) 
Spain (-0.2) 
Portugal (-0.2) 
Cyprus (-0.3) 
Greece (-1.4) 
Bulgaria (-1.6) 
Spain (-0.6) 
Poland (-0.7) 
Slovenia (-0.8) 
Bulgaria (-1.1) 
Greece (-1.1) 
Cyprus (-1.6) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 162). 
Notes: countries with ‘low inflation or deflation’ are the ones which showed inflation rates at least one standard 
deviation below the EU average. ‘High inflation’ countries are at least one standard deviation higher. * indicates 
forecast data. 
 
In terms of external balance, the trend of the previous years continued, with most creditor 
countries increasing their already huge current account surpluses even further (see Table 4). 
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The number of Member States with current account deficits decreased to nine. Germany, the 
EU’s largest creditor economy, has seen its current account surplus reach yet another record 
following the crisis: 8.8 per cent of its GDP or € 267 billion. On the other hand, the UK 
continued to have the largest deficit, exacerbated by growing import demand. Strong 
economic growth and accelerating consumption contributed to the deficits both in the Czech 
Republic and Latvia. In some cases, current account surpluses can still be seen as a legacy of 
the crisis, with internal aggregate demand still being restricted, such as in case of Italy (see 
Benczes and Szent-Iványi, 2015). But improving export performance has increasingly been 
emerging as a key driver of improving balances in 2015, with countries like Ireland, 
Germany, Spain, France, Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic experiencing substantial 
improvement in their export performance.  
 
Table 4. Average EU current account deficit (as percentages of GDP) and Member States with 
highest deficits and surpluses 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
EU 
average** 
-0.9 0.1 1.4 1.5 1.8 
Standard 
deviation 
4.4 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.8 
Highest 
current 
account 
surpluses 
Netherlands 
(8.8) 
Luxembourg 
(6.2) 
Germany (6.2) 
Sweden (6) 
Denmark (5.7) 
Netherlands 
(10.2) 
Germany (7.2) 
Sweden (6.5) 
Luxembourg 
(6.1) 
Denmark (5.6) 
Netherlands (11) 
Denmark (7.2) 
Germany (6.7) 
Sweden (5.8) 
Luxembourg (5.7) 
 
Netherlands (10.6) 
Germany (7.8) 
Slovenia (6.5) 
Denmark (6.3) 
Luxembourg (5.5) 
Sweden (5.4) 
Netherlands 
(10.4) 
Germany (8.8) 
Denmark (7.1) 
Slovenia (6.9) 
Highest 
current 
account 
deficits 
Portugal (-5.5) 
Slovakia (-5.5) 
Greece (-10.4) 
Greece (-4.3) 
Romania (-4.3) 
Cyprus (-5.1) 
France (-2.6) 
Cyprus (-3.8) 
United Kingdom 
(-4.5) 
 
Finland (-2.2) 
France (-2.3) 
Greece (-2.9) 
Cyprus (-3.8) 
United Kingdom (-
5.1) 
Latvia (-1.9) 
Czech Rep. (-2.4) 
Cyprus (-4.8) 
United Kingdom 
(-5.0) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 176). 
Notes: countries with high current account deficits are ones which showed deficits at least one standard deviation 
below the EU average. Those with high surpluses are at least one standard deviation above. * indicates forecast 
data. **: un-weighted average of Member State current account balances. 
 
Changes in competitiveness can be best approximated by the movements of the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), which captures the cost competitiveness of a country. The REER of 
the EU as a whole appreciated in both 2013 and 2014, but 2015 saw a substantial 
depreciation, driven mainly by a weakening single currency (see Table 5). As explained in 
last year’s contribution (see Benczes and Szent-Iványi 2015, p. 172), Member State REER’s 
can be more meaningful than that of the EU as a whole, which reflects the EU’s changing 
competitiveness via its external trading partners. Most Member States saw substantial 
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improvements in their REERs; only the UK and the Baltic countries saw deterioration. The 
unusually strong loss of 8.3 per cent in the UK was triggered by the appreciation of the pound 
(at least until the end of 2015) and the growth of wages in a relatively tight labour market, 
although according to the Guardian,6 wage growth was slowing throughout the year, and had 
dipped below 2 per cent in December 2015. Competitiveness rankings, especially the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, 2015), show 
only minor changes compared to 2014, with some newer Member States improving their 
positions by five or more places. Besides the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, Italy also managed to level up its competitiveness. The Greek deterioration in 
competitiveness finally came to a halt, but Greece still remained the least competitive country 
in the EU. 
 
Table 5. Average real effective exchange rates, and highest appreciations and depreciations 
(unit labour costs relative to a group of industrialised countries, percentage change on 
preceding year) 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU  0.5 -4.9 7.9 3.2 -8.4 
Un-weighted 
average of 
Member 
States 
0.1 -2.0 1.6 0.0 -2.6 
Standard 
deviation 
2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.2 
Highest REER 
depreciation 
Romania(-5.9) 
Ireland (-3.5) 
Poland (-2.6) 
Estonia (-2.5) 
Croatia (-2.5) 
Spain (-6.6) 
Greece (-6.2) 
Ireland (-6.2) 
Croatia (-5.8) 
Portugal (-5.8) 
Romania (-5.2) 
Greece (-6.3) 
Croatia (-2.6) 
Czech Rep. (-2.6) 
United Kingdom 
(-2.5) 
Hungary (-1.6) 
Czech Rep. (-6.3) 
Hungary (-4.2) 
Sweden (-3.8) 
Croatia (-3.6) 
Cyprus (-3.2) 
Ireland (-8.0) 
Greece (-6.5) 
Sweden (-5.7) 
Highest REER 
appreciation 
Czech Republic 
(2.9) 
Malta (3.7) 
Bulgaria (3.9) 
Sweden (7.5) 
Latvia (0.9) 
Luxembourg 
(0.9) 
Bulgaria (1.4) 
Sweden (3.0) 
United 
Kingdom (4.1) 
Estonia (5.2) 
Bulgaria (8.3) 
Estonia (3.7) 
Latvia (4.0) 
Bulgaria (4.4) 
United Kingdom 
(5.3) 
Latvia (0.9) 
Lithuania (1.1) 
Estonia (4.2) 
United Kingdom 
(8.3) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 167). 
Notes: countries with high REER depreciations are the ones which showed depreciations at least one standard 
deviation below the EU average. Those with high appreciations are at least one standard deviation above the 
average. * indicates forecast data. 
 
III. Economic policies in Europe 
                                                          
6 17 February 2016. 
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By and large monetary policy was very accommodative both inside and outside the eurozone, 
while fiscal policies were generally neutral. Some countries were rather active in downsizing 
their mountains of debt that they accumulated over the past few years, which has become one 
of the most serious challenges in the EU.  
The official lending rate of European Central Bank (ECB) remained close to zero in 2015, just 
like in most of the countries outside the eurozone. Although the Fed increased its benchmark 
rate after seven years from 0.25 to 0.5 in December 2015, the ECB did not follow suit. The 
nine non-EMU Member States were also reluctant to copy the Fed and either stuck to the 
previous levels (such as the UK and the Czech Republic) or administered a further easing of 
their monetary policy. The most aggressive cuts in 2015 were implemented in Hungary, 
which lowered interest rates to a record low of 1.35 per cent down from 11.5 per cent in 2008 
(see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Official central bank rates (in percentages) and long-term ratings  
 
 Official central bank 
rate (lending rate) 
Date of last rate 
decision 
Long-term ratings 
(Standard and Poor’s) 
Bulgaria  0.01 February 2016 BBB- 
Croatia 2.50 October 2015 BB 
Czech Republic 0.05 November 2012 A+ 
Denmark 0.05 January 2015 AAA 
Hungary 1.35 July 2015 BB+ 
Poland 1.50 March 2015 A- 
Romania 1.75 May 2015 BBB- 
Sweden -0.35 July 2015 AAA 
UK 0.50 March 2009 AA+ 
Eurozone 0.00 March 2016 various 
Source: websites of central banks and Standard and Poor’s. 
 
With rates close to zero, European central banks were forced to turn to unconventional 
measures in the last few years to support their economies and to provide the European 
markets with liquidity. By and large, unconventional policy tools meant the purchase of 
assets. Besides the ECB’s schemes such as the securities market programme, the outright 
monetary transactions programme, and the more recent public sector purchase programme, 
other European central banks have also been heavily involved in applying different 
unconventional measures. The Bank of England engaged in government bond purchases as 
early as January 2009, and launched its funding for lending scheme three years later. The 
scheme has been adopted by the Hungarian Central Bank as well. Hungary also set up a so-
called ‘bad bank’ in 2015, which would have the responsibility of cleaning up other banks’ 
balance sheets from toxic assets, especially mortgages. The Swedish and the Danish central 
banks decided to operate with negative deposit rates, while the Czech central bank started 
weakening the external value of the koruna more recently. On the other hand, the Bulgarian 
National Bank has become the target of harsh criticism for not being able to adequately 
supervise its financial system and for letting the country’s fourth largest commercial bank to 
collapse. 
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Taking into account the very lax monetary policy of the ECB and the weakening of the euro, 
none of the non-EMU countries seemed to gain too much in relative terms (i.e. compared to 
countries paying with the euro) by sticking to their national currencies in the last few years. In 
fact, many of them, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Romania, instead continued to 
face low credit ratings (see Table 6) and highly volatile market rates. For these countries, 
adopting the euro would efficiently reduce the exposure of their currencies and economies to 
volatile and often hostile international markets.  
While monetary policy continued to explore unchartered territories in order to boost aggregate 
demand, fiscal policy, in principle, can always be exploited by generating extra spending or 
lowering taxes – unless countries are strictly bound by legal restrictions to maintain sound 
fiscal positions, as they are in the EU. As for almost every single country embarked on large-
scale spending programmes at the beginning of the global crisis EU states were forced to start 
putting public finances back into shape as early as 2011. Fiscal space was, therefore, 
considerably reduced in the last couple of years. As a consequence, the average EU headline 
deficit ratio dropped to the threshold of 3 per cent by 2014. In 2015 Member States managed 
to reduce the deficit ratio even further to 2.5 per cent (see Table 7).7 This improvement was 
the consequence of the interplay of a multitude of factors, such as improved growth and 
reduced interest payments in particular.  
 
Table 7. Average general government budget balances (in per cent of GDP) in the EU, and 
best/worst performers 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mean -4.6 -3.8 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 
Standard 
deviation 
3.3 2.6 3.3 2.5 1.7 
Best 
performers 
Germany (-0.9) 
Estonia (1.0) 
Luxembourg 
(0.3) 
Finland (-1.0) 
Sweden (-0.1) 
Bulgaria (-0.5) 
Germany (0.1) 
Estonia (-0.3) 
Luxembourg 
(0.1) 
Sweden (-0.9) 
Germany (0.1) 
Luxembourg 
(0.6) 
Sweden (-0.9) 
Germany (0.3) 
Estonia (0.7) 
 
Estonia (0.3) 
Germany (0.5) 
Worst 
performers 
Ireland (-12.6) 
Greece (-10.0) 
Spain (-9.4) 
Lithuania (-
9.0) 
Ireland (-8.0) 
Greece (-8.6) 
Spain (-10.3) 
UK (-8.3) 
Greece (-12.2) 
Spain (-6.8) 
Slovenia (-
14.6) 
Bulgaria (-5.8) 
Croatia (-5.6) 
Cyprus (-8.9) 
Spain (-5.9) 
Portugal (-7.2) 
UK (-5.7) 
Croatia (-4.2) 
Greece (-7.6) 
Portugal (-4.2) 
Spain (-4.8) 
UK (-4.2) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 169). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed a budget position at least one standard deviation 
above the EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation below. * indicates forecast data. 
 
                                                          
7 The eurozone average was even lower: 2.2 per cent. 
11 
 
The method of restoring fiscal discipline differed from country to country. In general, 
countries heavily relied on both revenue-based and expenditure-based consolidations (or a 
mix of these two approaches) throughout the years 2010 to 2015. The substantial increase in 
revenues can be partly explained by the relative improvement of economic conditions, as 
cyclically adjusted total revenues had also increased recently. The most dramatic revenue-side 
consolidation was adopted by Greece, relying mostly on the increase of direct taxes (by one-
third). Belgium, Finland, Slovakia and Portugal were also very active in collecting more 
income in order to stabilise their public finances. Besides Greece, direct taxes such as taxes on 
income and wealth, were drastically increased in Finland, Portugal, Malta and France. Indirect 
taxes were increased especially in the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy and Slovenia. A third 
group of Member States, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia, initiated a 
consolidation in their welfare system by raising net social contributions. 
Spending-side consolidations were pursued mostly by countries outside the EMU: Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania and the UK. They were joined by the crisis-hit economies at the periphery 
and the Baltic States. These countries were all very active in downsizing welfare spending and 
public sector salaries, which are claimed to be the two politically most sensitive items 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995). Ireland, Portugal and Spain also cut public investment, reducing 
its size by roughly one half in five years.  
2015 was also a turning point in the post-crisis debt history of the EU. According to the 
European Commission’s (2016) estimates, public debt-to-GDP ratios seemed to be finally 
showing a declining trend. The average debt ratio peaked at a record high of 88.6 per cent in 
2014, but dropped to 87.2 per cent in 2015. In 2015, the new lows in both deficit and debt 
ratios came along with more countries successfully leaving the excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP). As a consequence of the financial and economic crisis, 24 Member States were put 
under EDP in 2010 and 2011. By 2015, their number had decreased to nine: the crisis-hit 
countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, along with Slovenia, Cyprus and 
France from the eurozone, plus Croatia and the UK.  
 
IV. Employment and Labour Market Policies after the Crisis 
During the years before the crisis, European labour market activity had shown an ever-
improving trend. Unemployment remained constantly below 10 per cent, reaching its lowest 
in 2008 at 7.0 per cent. The labour force participation rate steadily approached the magical 
level of 70 per cent, eventually reaching it in 2008. The crisis, however, witnessed millions of 
Europeans losing their jobs, with unemployment crawling up by a dramatic 3.9 percentage 
points by 2013. The labour force participation rate also decreased significantly, showing that 
many people chose to withdraw from the labour market altogether. Youth unemployment has 
also increased, with the large numbers of jobless providing increasing competition for new 
labour market entrants. 
The economic crisis has clearly put significant pressures on governments, provoking the 
adoption of a number of reforms. Fortunately, economic recovery in 2014 and 2015 had a 
noticeable impact on labour market tendencies, as demonstrated by Figure 1. 2015 saw the 
average rate of unemployment return to single-digit numbers, at 9.5 per cent, but with 
significant heterogeneity across the EU. This section of the contribution provides an overview 
of the EU’s post-crisis labour market recovery, first by analyzing the impacts of the crisis, 
followed by details on the impact of the recovery on labour markets, and finally government 
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policies. It argues that any optimism must be of the cautious variety. Both internal and 
external factors can make the currents trends not only highly vulnerable, but also easily 
reversible. Structural deficiencies are manifold. Most importantly, many EU countries are 
characterised by high levels of natural unemployment preventing the young and the 
chronically unemployed to enter the market.  
 
 
Figure 1. Labour Force Participation and Unemployment Rates in the EU, 2005-2015 
(percentages) 
 
Source: authors, based on Eurostat data. 
 
The crisis has had differential impacts on the labour markets of Member States. By clustering 
the countries into three different groups (the nine non-eurozone Member States, the 7 most 
heavily hit eurozone economies including Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and 
Slovenia, and the remaining 12 EMU Member States), an interesting pattern emerges. For the 
EU as a whole, unemployment steadily increased between 2008 and 2013. However, the three 
groups showed very different developments. While the nine countries outside of the eurozone 
experienced a very similar pattern to that of the EU average, eurozone Member States had a 
very diverging and, in fact, puzzling experience. The two waves of the recession had very 
different impacts on the two clusters with EMU countries (see Figure 2). The seven countries 
which were most heavily hit by the crisis faced a much more moderate increase in 
unemployment (compared to their starting levels in 2008) in the first phase (i.e. the global 
stage) than their fellow EMU peers. Surprisingly, it was only in 2010 when these seven 
economies reached the average losses of the EU.8 The other eurozone countries, on the other 
                                                          
8 In 2008, the seven most heavily hit economies started at a relatively low level of 7 per cent, while the other 12 
in the EMU had an average of 6.3 per cent. Non-EMU members recorded an average of 6.0 per cent in the same 
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hand, were hit massively by the first wave, elevating their unemployment rates on average by 
60 per cent in just two years. In the second phase, however, the situation dramatically 
changed. The European debt crisis phase led to a doubling of unemployment in the seven 
distressed economies by 2013. In the other 12 eurozone countries, however, the second wave 
did not push unemployment up. In fact, the ratio steadily declined following the peak year of 
2010. From 2013 onwards, unemployment improved in each of the three groups, though the 
seven heavily hit economies were still very far away from their pre-crisis levels in 2015. Most 
worryingly, with the exception of Cyprus, the share of long-term unemployed (those without a 
job for 12 months or more) was at least 50 per cent in these countries in 2015,9 reflecting 
serious structural deficiencies.  
 
Figure 2. Changes in unemployment, 2008=100 per cent 
 
 
Source: authors, based on Eurostat data. 
 
The analysis above reveals that the two phases of the double-dip recession had very different 
impacts on EU countries. While the collapse of the world economy in 2008 had a more 
pronounced impact on the core economies of the eurozone, the European debt crisis of 2010-
12 had a toll in terms of jobs almost exclusively on countries in the periphery and left the 
core, by and large, intact. Countries without the single currency did not perform either better 
or worse in terms of job losses than the EU average, thus, adopting the common currency in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
year. By 2010, the seven crisis hit economies had an unemployment rate of 11.5 per cent, while their EMU peers 
stood at 10.2 per cent. Non-EMU countries had quite a low level of 9.0 per cent. 
9 Greece had an abnormally high share of 73.7 per cent in 2015. Long-term unemployment is posing a real 
challenge for other countries as well such as Croatia (67.5 per cent), Slovakia (67.0 per cent), Bulgaria (63.0 per 
cent), Belgium (51.0 per cent) and Latvia (50.6 per cent).  
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
European Union Non-Eurozone countries
PIIGS+Cyprus+Slovenia Other Eurozone countries
14 
 
itself was neither an amplifier of the crisis, nor a remedy to it, at least in terms of labour 
market outcomes.  
From a country-by-country perspective, labour markets showed an even more profound 
heterogeneity (see Table 8). The most antinomic performance was produced by Germany. The 
country was severely hit by the first wave of the crisis, losing 5.6 per cent of its GDP in 2009, 
and found its unemployment rate peaking at 7.6 per cent in 2009. However, this rate was still 
much lower than what Germany suffered from just four years before that (11.2 per cent). The 
Hartz reforms, a series of tough labour market measures introduced between 2002 and 2005, 
seemed to pay off rather well for the former sick man of Europe.10 In fact, the second wave of 
the crisis found an improving labour market with an unemployment rate of 5.2 per cent in 
2013 when the EU average was at its highest. The rate dropped below 5 per cent in 2015.11 
While the German labour market can be seen as relatively dualistic with a high share of 
atypical employment (Eurostat, 2015), the flexibility of the labour market as a whole, 
including those in permanent positions, has increased substantially since the turn of the 
Millennium (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). This 
performance is especially impressive when seen together with a continuously rising labour 
force participation rate.  
Most other Member States, however, were not so lucky and have mostly seen 2-3 percentage 
points increases in their unemployment rates following the crisis. It is no surprise that the 
countries hit most severely by the crisis were also the ones which experienced the biggest 
hikes in their unemployment rates. Greece, Spain and Cyprus were the most dramatically 
affected countries. The change in unemployment between 2008 and 2013 (the years when EU 
averages were the lowest and the highest) was 19.7, 14.8 and 12.2 percentage points, 
respectively. Bulgaria (7.4 percentage points), Ireland (6.7), Croatia (8.7), Italy (5.4),12 
Lithuania (6.0), Portugal (7.6) and Slovenia (5.7) could not be proud of the degree of the 
deterioration either. These countries were all heavily impacted by both the global (2008-09) 
and the European (2011-12) phases of the crisis.  
The Baltic countries on the other hand showed a rather different pattern from all other 
members. These small and markedly open economies were heavily beaten by the first wave of 
the great recession by experiencing a two-digit increase in the rate of unemployment in two 
years (between 2008 and 2010).13 But from 2011 onwards, when the European public debt 
crisis took roots and pushed several economies into the second dip, they all managed to return 
to growth and make up for the job losses. Table 8 details the recent performance of Member 
States, and lists the best and worst performing countries. It is beyond the scope this 
contribution to speculate about either the causes or the consequences of such striking 
differences observed throughout the EU, but it reinforces analyses in the literature which 
argue that the eurozone is not an optimum currency area (see also Jager and Hafner 2013 or 
Handler 2013). 
 
                                                          
10 Hartz IV bundled together all the previously segmented unemployment and social benefits and provided one 
single benefit package to those in need. Since beneficiaries had to experience a substantial cut in the net value of 
their welfare benefits, the reform plan made Germany the only country in the EU where labour earnings 
inequality actually increased in the last few decades (Koske et al., 2012).  
11 The only country which managed to replicate the German trick was Malta (6.9 in 2009, 6.4 in 2013 and 5.4 in 
2015). 
12 Italy was an outlier in the sense that it experienced a further deterioration of 0.4 percentage points in 2014, too.  
13 In numbers: Estonia: 5.5, 16.7, Latvia: 7.7, 19.5, Lithuania: 5.8, 17.8 in 2008 and 2010, respectively. 
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Table 8. Average EU unemployment rates (in per cent of total labour force) and the best and 
worst performing Member States 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
EU average 9.7 10.5 10.9 10.4 9.5 
Standard 
deviation 
4.3 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.0 
Best 
performers 
Austria (4.6) 
Luxembourg (4.8) 
Netherlands (5) 
Austria (4.9) 
Luxembourg (5.1) 
Germany (5.4) 
Germany (5.2) 
Austria (5.4) 
Germany (5) Germany (4.8) 
Worst 
performers 
Ireland (14.7) 
Lithuania (15.4) 
Latvia (16.2) 
Greece (17.9) 
Spain (21.4) 
Portugal (15.8) 
Croatia (16) 
Greece (24.5) 
Spain (24.8) 
Portugal (16.4) 
Croatia (17.3) 
Spain (26.1) 
Greece (27.5) 
Cyprus (16.1) 
Croatia (17.3) 
Spain (24.5) 
Greece (26.5) 
Cyprus (15.6) 
Croatia (16.2) 
Spain (22.3) 
Greece (25.1) 
Source: author, based on European Commission (2016, p. 163). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed unemployment rates at least one standard deviation 
below the EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation higher. * indicates forecast data. 
 
In part at least, labour market structures and policies can be blamed for the severe impacts of 
the crisis in many countries. European labour markets have often been accused of heavy 
regulation and rigidity (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009). Countries like Portugal, Italy, Spain, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium all have systems of strong employment 
protection, which includes regulations on severance payments, and a set of complex legal 
restrictions and administrative processes on dismissing workers. While providing a degree of 
job security for those employed, these systems have the tendency to generate high 
unemployment, as they increase the cost of hiring workers, which in turn makes firms more 
reluctant to hire (Blanchard et al., 2014). In such situations, firms can be especially averse to 
hiring workers whose productivity can be difficult to assess, such as those of new entrants to 
the labour market, and those who have been unemployed for a long time. These problems 
have received much attention in the scholarly literature (see for example Saint-Paul, 1996), 
and European governments have been introducing measures to improve flexibility since the 
mid-1990s (Bentolila et al., 2012a). The main thrust of reforms focused on making the usage 
of part time and fixed term contracts (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). These ‘atypical forms’ of 
employment have gained popularity in many continental countries, and have resulted in the 
creation of dualised labour markets (Bentolila et al., 2012a).  
The spread of atypical employment however has only made European labour markets more 
flexible on the margins, and has not solved the underlying problem of rigidity and the high 
natural rate of unemployment (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003). It has also created new problems, 
ranging from social issues related to job insecurity and the inability of the atypically 
employed to access a number of services, all the way to negative impacts on productivity 
growth, with firms being reluctant to invest in training non-permanent employees. Promoting 
atypical employment was, however, seen by governments as politically attractive, as it did 
manage to create jobs in the short term, and allowed governments to avoid confrontation with 
trade unions, representing ‘insider’ workers in permanent contracts. 
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The boom of the pre-crisis years masked the unfavourable effects of dualised labour markets. 
The economic crisis underlined that dualisation might in fact be a dead end strategy for 
increasing labour market flexibility. With the onset of the crisis, firms were quick to lay off 
temporary workers, but full adaptation took a long time as laying off insiders was difficult and 
expensive. The example of Spain shows that the extremely high levels of unemployment can 
clearly be ascribed to the lax rules surrounding atypical contracts. Employees with such 
contracts have taken the brunt of layoffs after the crisis hit, but due to the low productivity of 
those in insider positions economic recovery was not made easier (Bentolila et al., 2012b). 
Reforming European labour market policies has thus become a priority after the crisis. The 
EU adopted the EU2020 growth strategy in 2012 with the goal of ensuring a 75 per cent 
labour force participation rate in the age group of 20 to 64 (European Commission, 2012a). 
No such ambitious target can be realistically achieved without bold structural reforms that 
enhance productivity, mobility and job quality. The goals of EU2020 were translated into 
policy proposals by the Employment Package (European Commission, 2012b), which aimed 
to help people find the way (back) to employment or find a higher quality and more rewarding 
job. It endorsed further internal flexibility and also called for active labour market policies. 
According to Ecorys and IZA (2012), active labour market measures such as (vocational) 
training or job-search assistance can be effective in delivering benefits both in the medium 
and in the long term. Fixed term contracts or employment incentives, however, provided 
rather mixed evidence. Employers can (mis)use the former to dismiss temporary workers; 
while the latter works only if targeted at specific groups and not the general employment.   
Member States have made some efforts to translate these and other policy frameworks into 
practice. The remainder of this section focuses briefly on two issues in labour market policy, 
increasing overall labour market flexibility and youth unemployment. 
Instead of supporting further dualisation, governments need to tackle the politically more 
sensitive issue of increasing the overall flexibility of their labour markets. The example of the 
Hartz reforms in Germany, as mentioned above, clearly shows that politically sensitive, large 
scale overhauls of labour market policies can be successful in the long run. Table 9 lists the 
main reforms that selected European governments have carried out since the start of the crisis, 
focusing on the countries which enacted the most significant reforms. The table shows that 
while many reforms have happened, a good number of them in fact entrench the dualistic 
nature of labour markets even further, for example by liberalizing the usage of fixed terms 
contracts even further, as in the cases of the Czech Republic, Italy and Portugal. There is also 
clear evidence of back tracking, with governments making firing and hiring in insider position 
even more difficult, as shown by reforms in Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg. The two 
countries with the most anaemic labour markets, France and Italy, however, have finally 
initiated important reforms in 2015 and early 2016, it is nonetheless still too early to tell how 
these will play out.  
 
Table 9. Labour market reforms in selected European countries, 2008-2015 
 
Country Reforms 
Belgium 2015: Increase of the notice period for redundancy dismissals. 
2012: Increase in the severance payment obligation. 
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Czech Republic 2014: Abolition of the minimum wage for young workers.  
2013: Increase in the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts and reduction in the 
severance pay applicable in cases of redundancy dismissals of employees with one year 
of service.  
2009: Reduction of limitations on overtime work per week.  
2008: Elimination of the obligation for retraining or reassignment in cases of redundancy 
dismissals.  
Finland 2015: Elimination of the requirement to notify a third party before dismissing an 
employee or group of employees 
France 2015: Substantial amendment of labour market regulations, including the provisions 
dealing with large-scale collective redundancy processes 
Germany 2016: Introduction of a minimum wage  
Greece 2012: Decrease in the severance pay applicable in case of redundancy dismissals 
Ireland 2014: End of a 60 per cent rebate for employers on severance payments and elimination 
of the requirement for third-party notification when terminating a redundant worker 
Italy 2016: New Jobs Act, which simplifies redundancy rules and encourages out-of-court 
reconciliation, reducing the time and cost for resolving labour disputes. Also broadens 
the coverage of unemployment insurance.  
2015: Relaxation of the conditions for using fixed-term contracts but reduction of their 
maximum duration to 36 months.  
2010: Usage of fixed-term contracts permitted for permanent tasks.  
2009: Increase in the notice period for redundancy dismissals.  
Luxembourg 2010: Increase in severance payments applicable in redundancy dismissals 
Poland 2011: Reduction in the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts 
Portugal 2016: Introduction of priority rules for redundancy dismissals and new regulations for 
collective bargaining agreements.  
2015: Reduction of the amount of severance pay per year of service and increase in the 
maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts.  
2014: Abolition of priority rules for redundancy dismissals.  
2013: Increase in the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts and reduction in the 
severance pay applicable in cases of redundancy dismissals.  
2012: Approval of new Labour Code: reduction in severance pay, reduction in overtime 
payment by 50 per cent, abolition of four paid public holidays, easier dismissal of 
workers 
2010: Increase in both the notice period for redundancy dismissals and the maximum 
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts.  
Spain 2014: Reduction of the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts and 
increase in the minimum wage.  
2013: Unlimited duration of fixed-term contracts allowed temporarily. 
2011: Reduction of the notice period applicable in case of redundancy dismissals.  
Source: World Bank (2016). 
 
In terms of youth unemployment, one of the seven flagship initiatives of the EU2020 strategy 
was called ‘Youth on the move’ which aimed at strengthening the entry of young Europeans 
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to the labour market. As part of EU’s Employment Package, the Youth Employment Package 
called for support in the form of continued education, traineeship or a new job after a four 
month waiting period for people under 25 who lost their job or left formal education. As the 
scheme is mostly financed by Member States, each country should adopt its own 
implementation plan. Until recently, the scheme only managed to make a real breakthrough in 
the wealthier countries with a strong welfare state system and an otherwise moderate youth 
unemployment rate such as Sweden, Finland or Austria (ILO, 2012). Youth unemployment 
remains worryingly high, especially in the Southern and some Eastern Member States. Youth 
unemployment for the EU as a whole peaked at 23.8 per cent in early 2013 and by the end of 
2015 decreased to just below 20 per cent. The highest values were recorded last year in 
Greece (48.4 per cent), Spain (47.5 per cent) and Croatia (44.9 per cent). Germany, on the 
other hand, had hardly any problem: youth unemployment was at 7.1 per cent in 2015. The 
efficient German labour market, but also the country’s relatively unique system of vocational 
training and apprenticeships seem to work well in absorbing young people.  
 
Conclusions 
The European economy continued its recovery in 2015, posting its highest growth rate since 
2007, fed by strengthening domestic consumption, a weakening single currency and 
improving export competitiveness. Europe’s decent growth performance was translated into 
decreasing unemployment, improving government budget balances, and reduction in public 
debt, all indicating that Europe has left behind the double-dip crisis. For the first time since 
the eruption of the financial and economic crisis, none of the EU28 economies recorded 
negative growth. The economic performance of the EU was less heterogeneous in 2015 than 
in previous years. 
Nevertheless, Europe’s recovery is still obviously fragile due to both internal and external 
factors. The global economic and political environment is full of uncertainties and 
ambiguities. Every corner of the world might hold something in store. The transition to slower 
growth in China, the tightening monetary conditions in the US, the slowing of economic 
activity in emerging markets, and conflicts in the Middle East can expose the European 
recovery to unwanted shocks in the near future. In such a hectic external environment, one of 
the crucial questions is whether the EU can respond collectively. The external shocks might 
pose rather different challenges for Member States. While small open European economies 
are strongly dependent on the large ones, especially Germany, and to a lesser extent France, 
the UK or even the Netherlands, the economic performance of the big ones is directly linked 
to overseas markets. Anything that happens in the USA or China can have a dramatic effect 
on Germany for instance. But events in Russia, Turkey, Korea, Japan or the United Arab 
Emirates, all in the top 20 trading partners of Germany, will have impacts. And the EU itself 
is not without internal troubles either. Greece is still at zero growth which pushes the country 
further away from the EU average. But Finland, Austria or Italy have nothing to celebrate yet 
either. Additionally, the unusually low rate of inflation, and indeed deflation in some 
countries, the still huge debt burdens, the threat of recovery without jobs etc. are all major 
problems, with monetary and fiscal policy not having much real capacity and ability to impact 
any of these. 
The contribution has also explored European labour markets and employment policies after 
the crisis. More than eight years after the financial and economic crisis, Europe is yet to return 
to pre-crisis levels of labour market performance. While European labour markets have 
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reacted well to the economic upswing, unemployment is still above the level of the pre-crisis 
era. Countries which were hit by the crisis the most are still much behind their peers on the 
road to recovery in terms of employment. Most worryingly, it is not only short-term 
unemployment that seems to pose a burden on the PIIGS (along with Slovenia), but also long-
term and structural unemployment. It seems that the inflexible and dualistic nature of 
European labour markets has made the impacts of the crisis unexpectedly painful in many 
countries, Germany being probably the only exception to this trend. Whether other countries 
should (or can) follow the German example is rather uncertain at this point, since Germany, 
the main market for most of the European countries, has become the most competitive 
economy in Europe, accumulating the largest surplus in its current account. Although the 
PIIGS countries did experience a recovery in their trade balance (with the exception of Spain), 
this happened mostly at the cost of reduced imports, while export capacity was barely 
strengthened. European countries should not be spared from much-needed structural reforms, 
yet, it is quite often the case that such reforms do put an extra burden on societies in the short 
run, which is quite unacceptable for many coming so soon after the sufferings of the crisis 
years.  
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